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Abstract
When studying redistributive attitudes, surveys show that individuals do
care about fairness. They also show that the cultural environment in which
individuals grow up a¤ects their preferences about redistribution. In this
article we include these two components of the demand for redistribution in
order to develop a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for
fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the obser-
vation and imitation of otherschoices in a way that is consistent with the so-
cialization process. More specically, observing during childhood how adults
have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the
concern for fairness or the moral cost of not supporting fair taxation. Based
on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent
steady states that may account for the huge and persistent di¤erences in re-
distribution observed between Europe and the United States. It also explains
why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution
continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country.
Keywords: redistribution, fairness, majority rule, socialization, endoge-
nous preferences
JEL: H53, D63, D72, D03
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1 Introduction
When studying redistributive attitudes, in a departure from traditional eco-
nomics surveys show that individuals do care about fairness (Fong, 2001;
Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo and Fong,
2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). More specically, they underline that
people tend to support more redistribution if they believe that poverty is
caused by factors beyond an individuals control, such as luck. Besides, sur-
veys stress the strong cultural component in the demand for redistribution
(Guiso et al., 2006; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Luttmer and Singhal,
2011; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). In particular, Luttmer and Singhal (2011)
and Alesina and Giuliano (2011) show that, after controlling for individual
characteristics, immigrants from countries with a preference for greater re-
distribution continue to support very signicantly higher redistribution in
their destination country. Taken together, these ndings are also consistent
with those of Corneo (2001), which support the view that individuals in
high-redistributive countries such as West Germany exhibit a greater con-
cern for fairness than individuals in low-redistributive countries such as the
United States1. Accordingly, the intensity of the concern for others appears
to some degree to be culturally shaped at young ages and to stop chang-
ing after reaching adulthood2. Understanding the development of an agents
preferences when young and the role of the cultural context are then of great
importance in explaining individual demands for redistribution, and hence
1Note nevertheless that while in Corneo (2001) the preferences of Americans seem to
be driven exclusively by egoistic goals, their willingness to pay for distributive justice
amounts to about 20% of their disposable income in Corneo and Fong (2008).
2Supporting this view, psychologists McCrae and Costa (1994) have shown that person-
ality traits stop changing after age 30. See Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) for a discussion.
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the diversity in redistributive policies in democratic countries.
Following robust empirical evidence that fairness and culture are two im-
portant components of redistributive attitudes, in this article we propose a
mechanism for the cultural transmission of the strength of the moral norm
or concern for distributive justice. Through socialization, taste is shaped by
the observation, imitation3 and internalization of cultural practices. More
specically, we argue that the observation during childhood of redistributive
policies that are far from what would be perceived as fair results in a weak-
ened concern for distributive justice. From this perspective, our approach is
close to that in the literature on crime, which shows that the incentive to be-
have in a certain manner depends on the degree to which we see others acting
in this way. As argued by Funk (2005), the strength of the social crime norm
is measured by the moral costs that arise from committing a crime. There-
fore, as is well established in this literature, if it is observed that many others
are commiting crimes, the remorse or guilt felt from breaking the social norm
is weakened. Our approach is also close to the work of Lindbeck et al. (1999,
2003), whose model shows that the individual guilt and social stigma linked
to living on benets decreases with the number of beneciaries. In contrast
with Funk (2005) and Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2003), in our setting the choice
is not binary. Therefore, to identify the deviation from the moral norm we
replace the fraction of deviators by the distance of the collective choice from
the norm. This way, we can apprehend the intensity of the deviation from
the norm more properly. Our approach is also closely related to Cervelatti et
al. (2010). However, in our model, to characterize the socialization process
3In the evolutionary literature, learning from others by imitation is a cheap and e¢ cient
way to acquire locally relevant information for adaptation. Accordingly, the propensities
to learn and to imitate are part of an evolved psychology shaped by natural selection
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Boyd et al., 2011).
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and the persistence of preferences over generations, deviating from the norm
a¤ects preferences with a delay of one generation. The moral cost of not sup-
porting fair taxation is reduced when observing how the previous generation
has collectively failed to implement a fair institution.
As a rst result of our intergenerational and cultural transmission mecha-
nism, assuming that the level of redistribution perceived as fair is higher than
the level selshly preferred, we explain that immigrants from countries with
a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistrib-
ution in their destination country because they have a stronger concern for
distributive justice. This result is also consistent with the ndings of Corneo
(2001). As a second result, the persistent di¤erences in redistribution be-
tween the United States and Europe are explained through multiple steady
states. Indeed, we show that if people are socialized in an environment whose
practices and institutions are close to (but lower than) what is perceived as
fair, the redistributive institution and the concern for fairness co-evolve and
are self-reinforcing such that the cultural transmission process ends with the
implementation of the high redistribution level. By contrast, if people are
socialized in an environment that is too far from what is perceived as fair,
then internalization of the observed norm you should behave according to
your own interests reduces individual responsibility regarding moral duty.
In that case, the cultural transmission process ends with the implementation
of the low redistribution level.
At steady state, our model satisfyingly reproduces the fact that redis-
tribution is higher in (continental) Europe than in the United States while
market income inequality appears lower in the former. From this perspec-
tive, our paper also builds on the literature and extends the canonical model
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of Meltzer and Richard4 (1981) to improve its main prediction that greater
income inequality results in greater redistribution a prediction which has
only weak support in the data5. The mechanism we propose is most closely
related to the theoretical literature analysing through which channels the
concern for otherswell-being may explain the di¤erences in redistributive
policies observed among democracies. The latter has focused mostly either
on beliefs or on group membership. If people care about the populations wel-
fare when considering redistribution, Piketty (1995) shows that international
di¤erences in the level of redistribution (when countries share identical eco-
nomic fundamentals) can be explained by di¤erent beliefs about the return
to e¤ort sustained by an imperfect learning process6. With income depend-
ing on both e¤ort and luck, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that cultural
variability in the level of redistribution arises as a multiplicity of equilibria
resulting from di¤erent self-fullled beliefs. Because they expect low redistri-
bution, Americans invest in their human capital and generate conditions for
low redistribution by reducing the importance of luck in the determination
of income. Conversely, by expecting a high redistribution, Europeans invest
less in their human capital and support more redistribution later. In the
4Its three dimensions have been extended: economic (Bénabou, 2000; Desdoigts and
Moizeau, 2005; de Freitas, 2012; Bredemeier, 2014), political (Roemer 1998; Rodriguez,
2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Campante, 2011) and behavioral (Bénabou and Ok,
2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). See Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Campante (2011) and
Acemoglu et al. (2013) for overviews.
5See Perotti (1996), Gouveia M. and Masia (1998), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), de
Mello and Tiongson (2006), and Iversen and Soskice (2006).
6In this approach, false beliefs about social mobility occur accidentally. In a di¤erent
vein, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) argue that children are actively endoctrinated with these
false beliefs by their parents, not for altruistic purposes but to transmit to them the value
that the world is just.
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second strand of the literature, people are supposedly (more or exclusively)
altruistic toward the members of their own group, or the group they identify
with. In this context, Lind (2007) and Lindqvist and Östling (2013) show
that ethnic fractionalization reduces redistribution. In the spirit of Gilens
(1999), they then propose that di¤erences in redistribution between Europe
and the United States are sustained by a di¤erence in ethnic fractionalization.
Somewhat di¤erently, in Shayo (2009), this di¤erence is sustained because
Americans (especially the poor) tend to think of themselves more as mem-
bers of the nation as a whole rather than as members of a social class, and in
any case more so than Europeans. The mechanism we propose provides then
a new explanation for the huge and persistent di¤erence of redistribution ob-
served between Europe and the United States based on the intergenerational
and cultural transmission of the strength of the concern for fairnesss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present in section 2 an
endogenous mechanism of the formation of preferences based on socialization.
In section 3, based on this mechanism and assuming that the perception of
the fair level of taxation is exogenous and unanimously shared in the pop-
ulation, we show that our model exhibits multiple steady states consistent
with the negative correlation between income inequality and redistribution
encountered in the data. We also explain why immigrants from countries
with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redis-
tribution in their destination country. In section 4, we extend and verify the
robustness of our results by considering endogenous and heterogenous views
of what is fair. We conclude briey in the last section.
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2 The social determinants of preferences
To characterize the socialization process, we consider an overlapping gen-
erations model in which each individual lives for two periods: childhood
and adulthood. People are educated and socialized during childhood, and
through this process they internalize the cultural practices that will inuence
their behavior when they become adults. As adults, they work and consume
in order to maximize their utility. Adult individuals also vote on income
redistribution.
2.1 Inequity aversion
As underlined in the introduction, an abundant literature shows that peoples
demand for redistribution reects that they do indeed care about the equity of
market income distribution, where factors beyond ones control such as luck
characterize the level of unfairness. Accordingly, following Piketty (1995),
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006), we assume
that income of an adult at date t is determined conjointly by luck and by
e¤ort such that:
yit = Aieit + i (1)
where eit denotes his e¤ort and i his luck (or bad luck), unknown before
the income distribution and such that E0 [i] = 0 (see Fig. 1). Ai  0
characterizes individual talent or ability. (Ai; eit; i) is assumed to be private
information to agent i, Ai and i being independent and identically distrib-
uted (i.i.d) across agents. We then associate any market income distribution
with a distribution perceived as fair by the population and with an optimal
linear redistributive tax rate  f 2 [0; 1] that would allow to implement the
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Figure 1: Timing of actions
fair income distribution. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005), this level of redis-
tribution is obtained endogenously and is at the basis of the multiplicity of
equilibria. In contrast, for the clarity of our purposes, we will consider rst
that the level of redistribution perceived as fair is exogenous and unanimously
shared in the population. We will investigate the limits of these assumptions
in section 4. We then consider an extended version of the Bolton-Ockenfels
model (2000) of distributive preferences in specifying the utility function as
follows:
Uit = uit   't 1
 
 f    t
2
(2)
where uit denotes the private utility from personal consumption and work
e¤ort, and 't 1 > 0 the strength of the concern for fairness or inequity
aversion that we assume was shaped during childhood.
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Assuming as in Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007)
that childrens consumption is part of their parentsconsumption, we then
specify the private utility as follows:
uit = cit   e
2
it
2
(3)
where cit denotes household consumption (one adult - one child) at date t.
Utility grows with consumption and decreases with e¤ort. The quadratic
disutility of e¤ort is for analytical simplicity. At each period t, the govern-
ment redistribute the income according to a simple scal scheme character-
ized by a at-rate tax  t and a lump-sum benet gt provided to all adults.
Assuming a balanced budget, this yields gt =  tyt, where yt denotes the mean
income at date t. As a consequence, each adult faces the following budget
constraint:
cit = yit (1   t) +  tyt (4)
2.2 Socialization
To incorporate social forces into individual behavior, one privileged way is
by considering the formation of agentspreferences7. Preferences are to some
degree socially determined so that agents internalize preferences that reect
the cultural practices of the society they inhabit. Through the process of
socialization, young individuals internalize, by imitation and learning, pref-
erences that will inuence their behavior when they become adults and will
explain the persistence of the cultural practices.
7See Postlewait (2011) for an overview of the di¤erent approaches in the economic
literature linking individual behaviors and social environment.
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Assume then that the distributive preferences of an individual youth at
date t   1 are inuenced by the observation of the social environment and
its degree of fairness. Denoting by  t 1 the e¤ective level of taxation at date
t   1 while  f is the level perceived as fair, we can characterize the social
environment by the social distance to distributive justice
St 1 =
Z
i

 f    t 1
2
di (5)
The higher St 1, the more unfair the redistributive system perceived by the
population. As the e¤ective level of taxation  t 1 results from a collective
choice of the adults at date t   1 through voting, a signicant St 1 reveals
a low weight attached to the moral norm adherence and a failure in imple-
menting fair taxation. This low weight is therefore transmitted to the young
generation through observation and imitation. Denoting 't 1 = (St 1), we
will then assume in the following that 0  0. Our mechanism is closely
related to that of Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2003) and Funk (2005), where the
disutility of deviating from the norm is non-increasing in the fraction of de-
viators. However, in our setting the choice is not a binary choice between
working full-time or living o¤ benets, as in Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2003),
or following the law or committing a crime, as in Funk (2005). Therefore,
to determine the deviation from the moral norm we replace the fraction of
deviators by the distance between the collective choice and the norm. In ad-
dition, in our model, to characterize the socialization process, the impact on
preferences of deviating from the norm applies with a delay of one generation.
The moral cost of not supporting a fair taxation is reduced when observing
how the previous generation has collectively failed to implement a fair insti-
tution. Note that, contrary to Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Bénabou and
Tirole (2006), the intergenerational cultural transmision mechanism we un-
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derline occurs through passive observation and imitation of society at large,
not through active behaviors of the parents to transmit values. As high-
lighted by the empirical ndings of Dohmen et al. (2012), those two aspects
of the cultural transmission process are relevant in inuencing child attitudes.
In light of these preferences, in the following section we study the resulting
individual demands for redistribution and the policy that will be implemented
in a democracy.
3 Redistributive policies in democracies
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass 1 of individuals at each
generation endowed with utilities (2) and characterized by their specic e¤ort
ei, their specic talent Ai and their specic luck i. As already mentioned,
Ai and i are i.i.d across agents. The optimal e¤ort resulting from the max-
imization of the expected utility E0t [Uit] is as follows:
eit = Ai (1   t) (6)
As redistribution lowers the market return to e¤ort, it reduces the e¤ort. In
addition, as the return to e¤ort grows with ability, more talented individuals
work harder. Considering eq. (6), the pre-tax income (1) of an adult at date
t can be rewritten as:
yit = ai (1   t) + i (7)
where ai = A2i . As the level of e¤ort is reduced by redistribution, obviously
the pre-tax income is also reduced.
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3.1 The individual demands for redistribution
Considering eqs. (3)-(4) and (6)-(7), maximizing utility (2) with respect to
the redistributive tax rate results in the following individual demands for
redistribution at date t:
 it =
8<:
a ai+2(St 1)f
2a ai+2(St 1)
0
if ai   a  2 (St 1)  f
otherwise
(8)
where a denotes the mean ai. Assuming maxi faig  2a is a su¢ cient con-
dition so that preferences are single-peaked in  t. Individual demands for
redistribution as specied in eq. (8) decrease with personal income, @ it
@ai
 0,
and increase with the level of redistribution perceived as fair, @ it
@f
 0. By
exhibiting both selsh and fair motives, eq. (8) is consistent with empirical
surveys (Fong, 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Corneo and Fong, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Eq. (8) also reects
the fact that adultsdemands for redistribution at date t are a¤ected by the
cultural environment in which they have grown up. More specically, if the
level of redistribution perceived as fair by an individual of type i is higher
than the level of redistribution he would have chosen under the selsh mo-
tive, then the degree of unfairness in the environment when young will lower
his demand for redistribution:  f  a ai
2a ai

maxifaig2a
, @ it
@St 1  0. Denoting
by ait the demand for redistribution of an individual of type ai, it follows
then from eq. (8) that:
Proposition 1  f  1
2
and  t 1   f yields @ait@t 1  0 8ai ( 2a).
Following Proposition 1, the specic e¤ect of being an immigrant coming
from a high redistribution country is then to support higher redistribution
compared to native individuals of the same type ai. Indeed, consider two
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representative individuals of type ai who have grown up at date t   1 in
two di¤erent countries D and F characterized by  Dt 1   Ft 1, everything
else being equal. In that case, according to Proposition 1 we will observe
F;Dait  D;Dait , where x;zait is the demand for redistribution of an adult of
type ai at date t living in country z and having grown up in country x.
From this perspective, if assuming  f  1
2
and  t 1   f , the demands
for redistribution as expressed in eq. (8) are consistent with the empirical
ndings of Guiso et al. (2006), Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Luttmer and
Singhal (2011). This is also consistent with the ndings of Corneo (2001).
Individuals in high-redistributive countries such as West Germany exhibit a
greater concern for fairness than individuals in low-redistributive countries
such as the United States.
3.2 The majority rule
We now assume that, in a democracy, any policy to be implemented must
be supported by a majority8. In our model, under the su¢ cient condition
maxi faig  2a, preferences are single-peaked in  . Thus the median-voter
theorem applies. Dene  = a   am, where am denotes the median ai that
we normalize am = 2. Assuming standardingly that the distribution of a
is skewed to the right yields   0. It follows from eq. (8) that the tax
rate chosen under majority rule can be expressed as9  t =
+2(St 1)f
2(1++(St 1)) .
Denote by  s = 
2(1+)
the tax rate chosen under majority rule if individuals
were driven only by their self-interest, i.e. if 't 1 = 0. This selsh tax rate
exhibits the standard Meltzer-Richard e¤ect: as income inequality rises, the
8As put forward by Corneo and Neher (2014), democracies implement to a large degree
the level of redistribution demanded by the median voter.
9We implicitly assume that an immigrant of the rst generation cannot vote in his new
country.
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median voter is poorer compared with the average, and then support a higher
redistribution: @
s
@
 0. The dynamics of redistribution under majority rule
can then be expressed as a convex combination of the purely interested and
the purely intuitively fair tax rates such that:
 t = t 1
s +
 
1  t 1

 f (9)
where t 1 =
1+
1++(St 1) 2 (0; 1). Dening any local steady state   as
verifying d

t
dt 1


 1, this then yields:
Proposition 2 If  (0) is su¢ ciently high, j
0(0)j
2(0)
bounded, 

 f    s2
su¢ ciently low and
0  f    s2  f    s2  1+2 , there exists (at least)
two local steady states US and EU characterized by  s  US < EU   f .
To understand this result, consider at date t the utility of the median
voter Umt = umt   't 1
 
 f    t
2
. We observe rst that his optimal choice
concerning redistribution, i.e. the level that will be implemented under ma-
jority rule at date t, is as close to the fair level as 't 1 is high. Therefore,
if people are socialized in an environment whose practices and institutions
reect intuitive fairness, i.e. the distance between  f and  t 1 is weak, 't 1
will be high and  t will stay close to 
f in the next period. More pre-
cisely, if  t 1 2

EU   ~; EU

where ~  0 is low enough and EU close
enough to  f , as 0  dt
dt 1

f
 1

if j
0(0)j
2(0)
< +1

it yields  t > 

t 1,
 f    t
2
<

 f    t 1
2
and then 't > 't 1. The generation that is young
at date t is socialized in an environnement that is closer to the fair institu-
tion than the previous generation. Hence, they will support an institution
that will be closer to fairness. This cultural transmission process ends with
the implementation of the high redistribution level characterized by the tax
rate EU . The redistributive institution and the concern for fairness coevolve
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and are self-reinforcing such that lim
t!+1
 t = 
EU and lim
t!+1
't 1 = '. Note
that if  (0) = +1, then ' = +1 and EU =  f . In that case, if starting
su¢ ciently close to the fair institution, the coevolution process will tend to
implement the fair institution. In addition, as the deviation from the tax rate
perceived as fair becomes innitely large, this steady state is characterized
with a complete conformism in the preferred redistribution level:  i1 =  f
8i even if individuals earn heterogenous income.
Consider alternatively that people are socialized in an environment where
practices and institutions do not reect the intuitive fairness: internaliza-
tion of the observed norm "you should behave according to your own in-
terests" will reduce individual responsibility regarding the intuitive moral
duty. This yields that the concern for fairness 't 1 is low, and the redistrib-
utive institution will stay far from fairness the next period. More precisely,
if  t 1 2

US; US + ~

where ~  0 is low enough and US close enough
to  s, as 0  dt
dt 1

s
 1

if
0  f    s2  f    s2  1+2  it yields
 t < 

t 1,

 f    t
2
>

 f    t 1
2
and then 't < 't 1. In this case, the
concern for fairness as well as the level of redistribution are decreasing with
time such that lim
t!+1
 t = 
US <  f and lim
t!+1
't 1 = ' 
< '.
Under the conditions in Proposition 2, the convergence towards di¤er-
ent steady states depends only on the initial level of redistribution. The
dynamics of redistribution is then history-dependent. In order to have a
more global view of this dynamics, let us consider the following function
 (St 1) = +St 1 . We can rst note that this function has good proper-
ties when considering Proposition 2. Indeed, it exhibits lim


=+1
 (0) = +1,
lim
=0+


 f    s2 = 0, j0(0)j
2(0)
= 1

and j0 (S)j S2 = 
(1+ S )
2 . Second, if
 = 0, we can specify conveniently the entire dynamics, which gives us:
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tt-1
tt
~± ~±
¿EU = ¿f
¿f
¿s
¿US¿s
® > ®^ ¯ > ^¯
b=0
Figure 2: Multiplicity and history dependance of redistribution
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Proposition 3 Dene  (St 1) = +St 1 and denote ^(f s)2 =
1+
4
. As-
suming 0 <   ^ then there exists ^  0, 1  0 and 2  0 such
that   ^ yields if  0 2

 f   ~1;  f + ~2

then lim
t!1
 t = 
EU , other-
wise lim
t!1
 t = 
US, where  s < US < EU   f , lim
=0
EU =  f , lim
=0
US =
1
2

 f +  s  
q
( f    s)2   4
1+

, lim
=^
~1 = lim
=^
~2 = 0 and lim
=0
~1 = lim
=0
~2 =
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
(Fig 2).
Compared with Proposition 1, the condition  (0) su¢ ciently high corre-
sponds to   ^ and the condition 

 f    s2 su¢ ciently low to   ^.
The history dependence of redistribution is then garantee only if both   ^
and   ^. By contrast, if  > ^ (while   ^), there exists only one
steady state, which is   = EU . Indeed, in that case, the distance between
the existing institution and the fair one cannot be high enough to reduce the
concern for fairness su¢ ciently and stop the convergence towards the high-
redistribution steady state. Note that, as  f    s  1, ~' > 1+
4
is a su¢ cient
condition such that   = EU is the unique steady state. Alternatively, if
 > ^ (while   ^), the concern for fairness is always too low to initiate any
convergence towards the high-redistribution steady state. The only steady
state is then   = US, where lim
=+1
US =  s.
If   ^ and   ^, persistent di¤erences in redistribution can exist
over long periods as they are linked to di¤erent preferences for redistribution
sustained by a process of cultural transmission. As underlined in Proposition
1, if  f  1
2
this may explain why immigrants from countries with a preference
for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their
destination country. In addition, as a high level of redistribution lowers the
level of e¤ort in the economy, a high-redistribution country is characterized
by a lower level of income inequality. Our model then also provides a rationale
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for the negative correlation between income inequality and redistribution
encountered in the data.
Note importantly that all our results have been obtained while assuming
a constant and unanimously shared level of redistribution perceived as fair.
However, as the level of e¤ort decreases with redistribution, as mentioned in
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), the importance of luck in the income determi-
nation increases, and we should observe a level of redistribution perceived as
fair that is lower in the low-redistribution steady state than in the high. This
suggests that the perception of fairness is endogenous to the level of taxation.
In addition, due in particular to di¤erent concepts of distributive justice, it
is likely that individuals have di¤erent perceptions of the just level of redis-
tribution within a same country. In the next section, we investigate whether
incorporating endogenous and heterogenous perceptions at the country level
(ex-post) and at the individual level (ex-ante) ts with our mechanism of cul-
tural transmission so as to explain the di¤erences in redistribution observed
between Europe and the United States.
4 Endogenous perceptions and robustness of
the mechanism
To characterize the level of redistribution that would be perceived as socially
optimal, studies show that individual merit is an important principle at both
the individual and aggregate levels. As shown by Alesina, Glaeser and Sac-
erdote (2001) for example, the belief that luck rather than e¤ort determines
income10 is a strong predictor of the national level of redistribution. How-
10From World Values Survey data, they highlight that 54% of Europeans versus 30% of
Americans believe that luck rather than e¤ort determines income.
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ever, individual merit cannot sum up all the principles of distributive justice.
Forsé and Parodi (2006) show for example that European countries share an
identical hierarchy of moral principles: rst, the guarantee of basic needs;
second, merit; and far less important, equality of income. In addition, deon-
tological principles such as "people should get what they deserve" can conict
with another moral concept, the greater good for all, i.e. the utilitarian con-
cept of social justice initiated by Bentham and Stuart Mill. A great deal of
literature has showed experimentally in recent years that these conicts be-
tween deontological principles and utilitarism, which form the basis of moral
dilemmas, are far from being of marginal importance, and are indeed a gen-
eral feature of moral thinking (see Greene, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008;
Cushman and Young, 2009). Accordingly, based on individual merit, we rst
develop a more satisfying specication of the distributive justice perception.
Second, we introduce a moral dilemma to underline that heterogenous per-
ceptions are very likely between individuals. In both cases, we verify that
these altenatives still t with our mechanism to explain the di¤erences in
redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.
4.1 Individual merit
According to meritocratic theories, wealth and income should be distributed
to match individual merit, which is usually understood as some combination
of talent and hard work. In our setting, we can then dene a deserved or
fair income as yfit = Aieit, i.e. only related to individual talent and e¤ort.
In such a meritocratic perspective, luck as dened in the model is an unfair
component of income. In that case, the level of redistribution perceived as
fair should be such that @
f
@^
 0 and  f (^ = 0) = 0, where ^ = R
i
jij di
characterises the importance of luck in the income determination. Recipro-
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cally, if the entire income determination is characterized only by luck, i.e.
yit = i 8i, equality of income appears intuitively fair as exhibited in the
lab (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Any rele-
vant specication of the fair tax perception should be such that @
f
@e
 0 and
 f (e = 0) = 1 8^ > 0, where e = R
i
eidi denotes the mean e¤ort and charac-
terizes the importance of e¤ort in the income determination. Accordingly, as
the mean level of e¤ort is decreasing linearly with the redistributive tax such
that e ( = 1) = 0 (eq. 6), we specify conveniently the level of redistribution
perceived as fair under the individual merit principle as11:
T f () = 
 
f +

1  
 
f

 (10)
where 0 < 
 
f  1 if ^ > 0. Introducing the new perception of fairness as
dened in eq. (10) into utility (2) then yields Uit = uit 't 1


 
f (1   t)
2
.
Assuming in addition that 't 1 = (St 1) = St 1 allows us to rewrite the
utility as Uit = uit   (1  t 1)2 (1   t)
2, and the dynamics of redistribution
11In Alesina and Angeletos (2005) the tax level perceived socially as fair is dened
as T f () = argmin 02[0;1]
R
i

udi   ufi
2
di

, where ufi = Aiei ()   ei()
2
2 denotes the
level of utility perceived as fair for an adult of type i, and udi = [Aiei () + i] (1   0) +
 0Aie ()  ei()
2
2 the e¤ective level of utility after redistribution. This then yields T f () =
2
2+(1 )22a
, where 2 and 
2
a denote respectively the variance of  and a. Using this
function appears unattractive for our purpose. Indeed, if asuming
2
2a
 14 , equation
 = T f () would exhibit two or three real roots that are particularly uninformative and
irrelevant concerning our mechanism. Uninformative because the mechanism underlying
these multiple roots is closely related to the mechanism described in Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), and not to ours. And irrelevant because, if assuming that  (0) = +1, these
three real roots are also three steady states with unsatisfactory properties. Indeed, any
individual coming from a country characterized by one of these steady states and living in
a country characterized by one of the two other steady states would have a strictly similar
attitude toward redistribution as a native with the same characteristics.
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becomes  t = t 1
s +
 
1  t 1

where t 1 =
1+
1++ 
(1 t 1)2
. Following
Proposition 3, this then yields straightforwardly:
Corollary 4 Dene  (St 1) = St 1 and T f () =  
f +

1  
 
f

 , 0 <

 
f  1. If 0 <   1+
4
(1   s)2 the model exhibits two steady states US
and EUsuch that  s < US = 1
2

1 +  s  
q
(1   s)2   4
1+

< EU = 1.
Assuming that  (St 1) = St 1 , then at rst glance Corollary 4 seems to
involve that dening the level of redistribution perceived as fair as in eq. (10)
is strictly similar to setting  f = 1. Indeed, the dynamics and therefore the
levels of redistribution obtained both in the low and in the high-redistribution
steady states do not depend on 
 
f , which can be in particular 
 
f = 1,
i.e. T f () = 1 8 . However, dening  f as in eq. (10) has important
consequences in terms of the perception of fairness in di¤erent countries.
Indeed, at steady states, the higher the level of redistribution, the higher the
level of redistribution perceived as fair: T f  US < T f  EU. In addition,
if assuming T f  US  1
2
, or equivalently 
 
f  12 US
1 US , so that Proposition
1 holds, this also yields that US;USai = sup
 
a ai+ 2
(1 US)2
2a ai+ 2
(1 US)2
; 0
!
 EU;USai =
T f  US < EU;EUai = T f  EU. Compared with the previous section using
a constant perception of fairness, an individual socialized when young in the
high-redistribution country will support less redistribution if he moves as
an adult in the low-redistribution country (because the perceived inequity
in the income distribution appears lower), while still supporting a higher
redistribution in his destination country than do the natives.
Considering this result, one may express concern about its generality and
relevancy when observing that EU = T f  EU = 1 in the case studied.
However, following Proposition 3, this can be generalized with  (St 1) =
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+St 1 so that 0 <   ^


 
f
2
yields EU < 1 and then T f  EU < 1.
More deeply, EU = T f  EU = 1 results also from having the individual
merit as the only principle governing the perception of distributive justice.
4.2 Moral dilemma and heterogeneity
In addition to the deontological principle "people should get what they de-
serve", consider distributive justice as also governed by the utilitarian con-
cept so that the pure utilitarist redistributive taxation is dene as  u =
argmax2[0;1]
R
i
uitdi
	
. Obviously, as people are risk-neutral in our setting,
this optimal utilitarist redistributive taxation is nil,  u = 0. In that case, the
deontological and utilitarist minds provide two di¤erent answers to the ques-
tion of distributive justice12. Assuming that this moral dilemma is resolved
with a unique perception specied by  fT f ()+ 1   f  u, where  f 2 [0; 1]
denotes the intensity of the deontologist mind compared to the utilitarist, we
can redene utility as Uit = uit   't 1

 fT f ( t)   t
2
. Following Proposi-
tion 3 and Corollary 4, this then yields that if  (St 1) = St 1 ,  f 2

1
2
; 1

and
0 <   ^ the model exhibits two steady states US and EU with good prop-
erties such that  s < US = 1
2

 f +  s  
q
( f    s)2   4
1+

< EU =  f .
In this way, the concern about having EU = 1 has been addressed. Go-
ing one step further, knowing that  f characterizes one type of personality,
there is no objective reason to consider that each individual would be char-
12In the new synthesis in moral psychology, the deontological and utilitarist signals are
conveyed through dissociable psychological processes. Conversely to traditional philoso-
phy, this literature shows through functional neuroimaging that the deontological signal
is associated with an emotional answer, while the utilitarist signal is associated with an
unemotional reasoning (see Greene, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Cushman and Young,
2009).
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acterized with the same personality. Therefore, assuming for simplicity and
with no loss of generality that 
 
f = 1, we consider new utilities specied as
Uit = uit   't 1
h
 fi    t
i2
, where  fi is assumed i.i.d across individuals, i.e.
that each individual is associated with a deontologist intensity  fi irrespective
of his own income.
As  fi is i.i.d across agents, the social distance between the perceived social
optimal tax rate and the chosen one at date t  1, St 1 =
R
i
h
 fi    t 1
i2
di,
can be expressed as:
St 1 = 2f +

 f    t 1
2
(11)
where  f and 2
f
denote respectively the mean and the variance of  fi . If
2
f
= 0, the perception of  f as the fair redistribution is unanimously shared
in the society. It is the case in section 3. By contrast, if 2
f
is high,  f is
of low signicance in the population for dening a shared norm of fair level
of redistribution. Therefore, everything else being equal, the social distance
between the perceived social optimal tax rate grows with the variance of  fi .
If the distributions of ai and 
f
i are both symetric, the pivotal voter is the
individual with the mean talent a13 and the mean personality and perception
 f (see Di Tella and Dubra, 2013). The dynamics of redistribution under
majority rule can then be expressed as
 t =
(St 1)
1 +  (St 1)
f (12)
and this yields according to Proposition 3:
Corollary 5 Dene  (St 1) = St 1 . If 0 <   ^ and 2f  ^ the model
exhibits two steady states US and EUsuch that  s (= 0) < US < EU   f ,
13In that case,  s = 0 and the model can no longer exhibit the Meltzer-Richard e¤ect.
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lim
2
f
=0
US = 1
2

 f  
q
( f )2   4

and lim
2
f
=0
EU =  f .
As stated by Corollary 5, the existence of multiple steady states does not
rely on the assumption that the perception of the fair redistributive tax is
unanimously shared in the population, i.e. 2
f
= 0. In addition, even if
assuming  (0) = +1, as long as 0 < 2
f
 ^2f then the high-redistribution
steady state is no longer characterized by a complete conformism in the pre-
ferred levels of redistribution. As a consequence, this high-redistribution
steady state exhibits a level of redistribution that is lower than the mean fair
level  f . Interestingly, if 2
f
> ^, then the unique steady state is the low-
redistribution one. Indeed, in that case, the signicance of  f is too low in the
population to dene a reliable norm of fairness. The concern for fairness is
then too low to initiate any convergence towards a high-redistribution steady
state. If assuming that  fi 2 [0; 1], we can no longer assert that coming from
a high-redistribution country is a su¢ cient condition to support a higher re-
distribution. In particular, if we consider an individual of type

ai; 
f
i = 0

,
the more intense the persons concern for distributive justice, the lower the
support for redistribution. However, after controlling for observable individ-
ual characteristics, only types
 
ai; 
f

are considered. Therefore, we only
need to assume  f  1
2
to be consistent with surveys.
5 Conclusion
If it is accepted that humans are driven solely by self-interest, Meltzer and
Richard (1981) show that the level of redistribution in a democratic society
is increased by inequality in the income distribution. However, this result
has only weak support in the data. In this paper, we argue that the failure
of the canonical model is due in part to its behavioral assumptions. De-
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parting from traditional economics, empirical studies and individual surveys
show that individuals do care about fairness in their demand for redistrib-
ution. These studies also show that the cultural environment in which in-
dividuals grow up a¤ects their preferences about redistribution. We include
these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to propose
a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The
preferences of the young are partially shaped through observation and im-
itation of others choices in a way that is consistent with the socialization
process. More specically, observing during childhood how adults have col-
lectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern for
fairness or the moral cost of not supporting a fair taxation. Based on this
mechanism and assuming that the perception of the fair level of taxation
is exogenous and unanimously shared in the population, the model exhibits
a multiplicity of history-dependent steady states that may account for the
huge and persistent di¤erences in redistribution observed between Europe
and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with
a high preference for redistribution continue to support higher redistribution
in their destination country. These results have been shown to be robust
for extended specications of the perception of the fair level of taxation, in
particular if they are heterogenous across individuals.
In the specications we have used, we have considered for simplicity child-
hood only as a passive period during which individuals are socialized and
internalize cultural practices. However, childhood is also a crucial period
during which individuals can actively invest in their human capital through
e¤ort at school. Knowing that e¤ort at school depends on the expected
return, which is negatively impacted by the future level of redistribution, in-
troducing education explicitly in our model would result in a dynamic of re-
25
distribution that is driven not only by history but also by expectations. From
this perspective, incorporating investment in human capital in the present
analysis appears to be a promising avenue for further research.
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Appendix. Proof of Propositions and Corol-
laries
Proposition 1
From eq. (8) it follows that:
ait =
8<:
a ai+2(St 1)f
2a ai+2(St 1)
0
if ai   a  2 (St 1)  f
otherwise
Accordingly, it yields:
@ait
@ t 1
=
8<:  40
f (2a ai) (a ai)
(2a ai+2(St 1))2

 f    t 1

0
if ai   a  ~'
2
f
+[f t 1]
2  f
otherwise
Therefore, if  f  a ai
2a ai

maxifaig2a
and  t 1   f , @ait@t 1  0. As 
f  1
2
yields  f  a ai
2a ai 8ai  2a, it follows that if  f  12 and  t 1   f ,
@ait
@t 1
 0
8ai  2a.
Proposition 2
As the dynamics of redistribution is specied as  t = t 1
s+
 
1  t 1

 f
where t 1 =
1+
1++

[f t 1]
2
 and  f    t 12  0, any root   of the
stationary equation is such that   2  s;  f. As 0  0, consider rst
the case where  (0) is high enough such that  (0) = +1. In that case,
  =  f is a root of the stationary equation. Consider in another case that


 f    s2 such that  f    s2 = 0. This yields that   =  s is
also a root of the stationary equation.
Consider now that any root must verify in their neighborhood
 dtdt 1   1
to be considered as a local steady state of the dynamic process, where d

t
dt 1
=
2
0  f    2   f    s   f     1+h
1++

[f ]2
i2  0. Therefore, if
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 (0) = +1 and j0(0)j
(0)
< +1, dt
dt 1

=f
= 0 and   =  f is a steady
state of the dynamic process (9). In addition, if 

 f    s2 = 0 and0  f    s2   f    s2  1+2 , dtdt 1 =f  1 and   =  s is a also a
steady state of the dynamic process. Therefore, we can assert that if  (0)
is su¢ ciently high, j
0(0)j
2(0)
is bounded, 

 f    s2 is su¢ ciently low and0  f    s2  f    s2  1+2 , there exists two local steady states US
and EU characterized by  s  US < EU   f .
Proposition 3
Let us dene  (St 1) = +St 1 and t =  f  t the di¤erence between the
mean fair and the e¤ective level of taxation. Assuming rst that  = 0, eq.
(9) can be rewritten as:
t =
1 +
1 ++ 
2t 1
 
 f    s (13)
and stationarity is then dened by:
3     f    s 2 + 
1 + 
 = 0 (14)
If 
(f s)2
 1+
4
, eq. (14) exhibits three real roots  = 0,  =
f s+
q
(f s)2  41+
2
and  =
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
.
In addition, as 1+
1++ 
2t 1
 
 f    s is continuous and monotonous in 2t 1,
as
@
24 1+
1++ 
2t 1
(f s)
35
@2t 1
 0, and as lim
2t 1!0
@
24 1+
1++ 
2t 1
(f s)
35
@2t 1
= 0, if  f    s 
2
q
~'
1+
, there exists two steady states characterized by
 dtdt 1   1 which are
 = 0 and  =
f s+
q
(f s)2  41+
2
, where  s = 
2(1+)
and  = a   am.
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In addition, as long as j0j < 
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
, lim
t!1
t = 0, otherwise
lim
t!1
t =
f s+
q
(f s)2  41+
2
.
Equivalently, as t =  f  t , we can assert that assuming (f s)2 
1+
4
,
if  0 2
i
 f   ~;  f + ~
h
then lim
t!1
 t = 
f , otherwise lim
t!1
 t =
1
2

 f +  s  
q
( f    s)2   4
1+

,
where ~ =
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
.
Besides, the dynamic process enxhibits only one steady state L if  is
large enough such that lim
=+1
 = 1, lim
=+1
L = 
s.
As @
@
> 0 and lim
=f
 = 0, it follows that if 
(f s)2
 1+
4
there exists
^  0, 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 such that   ^ yields if  0 2

 f   ~1;  f + ~2

then lim
t!1
 t = 
EU , otherwise lim
t!1
 t = 
US, where  s < US < EU   f ,
lim
=0
EU =  f , lim
=0
US = 1
2

 f +  s  
q
( f    s)2   4
1+

, lim
=0
~1 = lim
=0
~2 =
f s 
q
(f s)2  41+
2
and lim
=^
~1 = lim
=^
~2 = 0.
Corollary 4
Dene  (St 1) = St 1 and T f () =  
f +

1  
 
f

 , 1   f  
 
f > 0.
In that case, utility (2) can be rewritten as Uit = uit   
(1 t 1)
2 (1   t)2.
Identifying 1 with  f , it goes straightforwardly that the dynamics of redis-
tribution (9) can be expressed as
 t = t 1
s +
 
1  t 1

where t 1 =
1+
1++ 
(1 t 1)
2
, and then, according to Proposition 3, that 0 <
  1+
4
(1   s)2 the model exhibits two steady states US and EU such
that  s < US = 1
2

1 +  s  
q
(1   s)2   4
1+

< EU = 1.
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Corollary 5
Dene  (St 1) = St 1 where St 1 = 2f +

 f    t 1
2
. Assuming that
ai and 
f
i are symetric, the dynamics of redistribution can be expressed as
 t =
(St 1)
1+(St 1)
f , or equivalently as:
 t =
 
1  t 1

 f
where t 1 =
1
1+ 
2
f
+[fm t 1]
2
 f . Following Proposition 3, if 0 <  
^ and 2
f
 ^ the model exhibits two steady states US and EUsuch
that  s (= 0) < US < EU   f , lim
2
f
=0
US = 1
2

 f  
q
( f )2   4

and
lim
2
f
=0
EU =  f .
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